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ABSTRACT 
We are already engaged in a stream of experiencing in which we strive to 
navigate our way toward what we value. Taking this depiction of the human 
condition as the starting point, in this dissertation my aim is to embark on an 
inquiry that aims to identify a few reasonable tools of thinking that may help 
humans live more reflective and meaningful lives. 
The project builds strongly on the foundations laid out by pragmatist 
philosophy, especially the balanced, experiential, and inquiry-oriented style 
of pragmatism offered by John Dewey. The starting point for such a 
philosophy is the stream of experiencing we are already engaged in as active 
and caring beings. Within this unfolding life, we strive to grasp what is 
happening, we strive to realize what we value, and we strive to decide what is 
worth valuing. In other words, we engage in what Dewey calls an inquiry, 
through which we aim to increase our capability to navigate this stream of 
experiencing called life to better actualize what is valuable within this life. All 
we have at our disposal in this inquiry are the concepts, theories, values, and 
other tools of thinking that we have acquired from within this life. There is 
nothing external that can be used to justify certain theories or values; total 
certainty is unavailable for us fallible human beings.  
Yet certain tools of thinking are more warranted than others: Relying on 
them in past inquiries has tended to lead us to where we want to get. Instead 
of vainly yearning for truths, we can trust and utilize those tools of thinking 
that have proven themselves to be more reliable maps in helping us navigate 
our experiential realities. In the final analysis, even reflectively endorsed 
values are nothing more than tools of thinking subject to being re-designed 
in the future to better suit the wholeness of our lives. 
Philosophical inquiry grows out of actual living, and that’s where it ends 
too. Its ultimate value is in designing better working conceptual tools that 
can assist people in the real-life tasks of living good and worthy lives. This is 
also the task of the present dissertation, which consists of an introduction 
and six independent articles that all apply the same pragmatist point of view 
to different pertinent contemporary philosophical questions to illustrate 
what it means to approach philosophy and life as a pragmatist. 
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INTRODUCTION?
We are already engaged in a stream of experiencing in which we strive to 
navigate our way towards what we value. This is the thesis of this dissertation 
put into one sentence. More poetically: 
We are thrown into a world to actively pursue what we value. 
This brief statement is already impregnated with several important claims 
about the fundamental nature of the human condition.  
First, it locates the starting point for thinking and philosophizing within a 
stream of experiencing that is already unfolding. We can never completely 
escape our particular human position into an objective God’s-eye-view, nor 
can we exclude ourselves to arrive at a blank tabula rasa position. Instead, 
human living and human inquiry – be it philosophical, scientific, or whatever 
other kind – always takes place in the midst of a life that is already 
happening and where we already have acquired certain beliefs, 
commitments, preferences, values, and other tools for processing the 
unstoppable experiential stream. All of us are entrapped into our particular 
lives; our acting and thinking take place in a particular place and time.  
Second, as living beings we care about what we are experiencing. There is 
no escaping the fact that the world gets under our skin; how the stream of 
experiencing unfolds concerns and affects us. It is practically impossible for a 
human being to stay totally indifferent to the contents of the experiential 
stream. Some types of experiences seem more attractive to us than others. 
We prefer, value, yearn, desire, and want certain things to take place while 
avoiding certain other things. There might be distinctions to be made 
between different types of preferring, but as long as we breathe, total 
indifference is not an option. Physical pain still feels painful. To be human is 
to be an organism for which things have value; an organism that cares about 
what is happening.  
Third, we seem to have some agency over what kind of experiences we 
will experience in the future. Instead of merely passively observing the 
experiential stream, we seem to play an active role. Simply put, a capability 
to influence certain things is a key part of how we relate to the stream of 
experiencing. Without going into the question of whether ‘free will’ ‘truly’ 
exists, when examined, for example, from a scientific point of view or an 
impartial third-eye view, there is no escaping the fact that as human beings 
we experience the world from an agentic point of view: We feel that we have 
a degree of control over certain things, mainly our bodily movements, which 
in turn seems to make it possible to manipulate both our social and physical 
environments. Our relation to the experiential world is, thus, active. 
Fourth, despite our experience of agency, we are far from having total 
control over how the stream of experiencing will unfold. The world keeps 
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happening, it keeps flowing in unexpected and undesired directions; it does 
not obey our wishes. Notwithstanding a degree of agency, the world offers 
considerable resistance, making certain paths within experiencing easier to 
achieve than others. We thus seem to be embedded within a wholeness in 
which our agency plays only a partial role among the plethora of forces at 
play. In other words, a degree of struggle characterizes our relation to the 
experiential world.  
This description is a rough characterization of the human condition that 
serves as the starting point for philosophizing in pragmatism (as I argue in 
article 1: Pragmatism as an attitude). It means acknowledging that we are 
already engaged in a world that constantly unfolds in partially uncontrollable 
ways and in which we must exhibit agency to obtain the goals and values 
about which we care. From this outline of the way of approaching life and 
philosophizing on which the present thesis is based, certain key conclusions 
can already been drawn.   
First, having some agency within the stream of experiencing where there 
are many seemingly uncontrollable flows makes navigating necessary: If we 
want to move towards what we value, we must have some understanding of 
how the experiential world works. By identifying regularities and patterns in 
the stream of experiencing, we can build up warranted assertions that can 
offer us significant guidance in our task of moving towards desirable ends 
and away from undesirable experiences. Our convictions, beliefs, and 
theories are thus a kind of cognitive map we use to navigate the experiential 
world. Given our specific aims and goals, we might have better or worse 
maps, in the sense that utilizing the guidance of certain maps will more 
predictably lead us to the outcomes at which we aim (as I argue in article 2: 
Fallible inquiry with ethical ends-in-view). Some ways of interpreting the 
world are thus more fruitful than others in bringing into being what we 
desire and value. Our capacity for reflective thinking and the mental maps it 
produces are, in the final analysis, in the service of action.  
Second, any dreams of undisputed facts or values must be abandoned as 
such irrefutable bedrock principles are out of reach for us mortal beings 
entrapped within a particular unfolding life. Accepting fallibilism and 
abandoning the quest for certainty is a key part of the pragmatist attitude 
and way of philosophizing (as article 1 makes clear). Instead of a desperate 
search for ‘truths’ or ‘objective facts’, pragmatists are satisfied in 
investigating matters to come up with assertions that the previous 
experiences give most warrant to believe. Instead of erecting some human-
invented principle on a pedestal and submitting to this false idol, we must 
accept that all human principles, values, theories and beliefs stand on legs of 
clay, above an abyss. 
Third, this all leads to a re-evaluation of the task of philosophy itself. If it 
can not offer any privileged path to final truths, what should its aims be? As a 
contextualized action taking place within a human life, philosophy should 
serve living in the same way as any other forms of human inquiry. Thus, 
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philosophical theories should not be judged on whether they have ‘found the 
truth’ but on whether the theory strengthens people’s capability to live a life 
that they see as good. Philosophical theories are thus ‘social technology’, and 
philosophers crafting these theories are kind of ethical engineers (as I argue 
in article 3: Moral philosophers as ethical engineers), who reveal, 
investigate, refine, and reinvent the deep-held theories about the world, 
ourselves, and our values that human beings need for living. 
Fourth, we must understand that what we value stands not outside the 
inquiry. It is not something externally given. Like our beliefs and maps of 
reality, our goals and values take shape and evolve constantly as the stream 
of experiencing unfolds. We might start out with certain rudimentary natural 
preferences and dispositions, most clearly our physical needs for oxygen, 
water, and food, but growing up into a culture significantly shapes what 
organisms such as humans come to value and prefer. One key task of 
philosophy becomes that of aiming to sort out these various potential values 
and preferences, trying to identify the ones that have some merits over others 
and could thus better serve as valuing tools for humans aiming to live a good 
life (I aim to do this in article 5: Four reasonable, self-justifying values). 
This task can be accomplished using several methodologies ranging from a 
more axiological approach that can help in identifying and clarifying the 
boundaries of the potential self-justifying values (as employed in article 4: 
Meaningfulness as contribution) to more empirical approaches that can help 
in examining the motivational potential of a certain self-justifying value (as 
reviewed in article 5). Value inquiry thus proceeds with the same logic as any 
other type of reflective human inquiry, aiming to design a set of values that 
on the whole suit our kind of creatures living in our kind of environmental 
conditions. 
Fifth, the pragmatist attitude that I have outlined here should not only be 
applied to philosophizing but can also be applied to living. If a person takes 
seriously the above points about the human condition and aims to live as if 
they were true, then this commitment should already lead to a certain 
attitude of growth being part of one’s outlook on life. Given the particularities 
of the human viewpoint and the impossibility of any objective viewpoint, one 
can never rest on one’s oars, confident that one has already arrived at the 
final way of seeing the world. Instead, what one can do is consciously commit 
oneself to cultivate one’s worldview; to aim to expand one’s moral and 
general outlook on life in order to grow one’s ability to live a good life (as I 
argue in article 6: Is moral growth possible for managers?). Commitment 
to growth thus becomes a key attitude for a person aiming to live one’s life 
with a pragmatist attitude.  
Here I have, in very broad strokes, attempted to paint the path of inquiry 
in which the present dissertation engages in. Beginning with spelling out the 
starting point and nature of inquiry for my style of philosophizing, I engage 
on a journey where I apply this way of thinking especially to the question of 
what we should value in life. Separate articles in the dissertation aim to 
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elaborate various parts of the above outline. Simplifying things somewhat, 
we may say that the first article (Pragmatism as an attitude) lays the 
groundwork by aiming to identify the ways of seeing the world that unite 
Peirce, James, and Dewey, which makes one’s thinking pragmatist. 
Embeddedness in the stream of experiencing, caring about its outcomes, 
partial agency, fallibilism, and future-oriented, action-serving nature of 
inquiry are key components of what I come to call the pragmatist attitude. 
The second article (Fallible inquiry with ethical ends-in-view) aims to show 
how pragmatism is different from both more realist and more constructivist 
and postmodern schools of philosophy. It especially concentrates on the 
nature of inquiry and how Deweyan pragmatism sees inquiry as action-
oriented, value-laden, and fallible, and how the more reflective forms of 
inquiry are outgrowths of the organic proto-inquiry in which all living 
organisms engage. The third article (Moral philosophers as ethical 
engineers) is the most metaphilosophical, arguing for a view of 
philosophizing that begins with particular human experiencing and ends in 
serving this experiencing. Moral philosophers are, accordingly, a kind of 
ethical engineers who use their expertise with ethical questions to criticize 
the currently used ‘moral technology’, and to construct novel concepts, tools 
and theories that better serve human beings in their striving to live morally 
good lives. 
The final three articles examine the ends-in-view or values that human 
beings pragmatically ought to adopt in a world devoid of objective values. 
The fourth article (Meaningfulness as contribution) argues that there seems 
to be a limited number of goods at which philosophers usually look, when 
trying to identify the intrinsic values of human beings. While well-being, 
moral praiseworthiness, and meaningfulness are the most commonly named 
candidates, the article argues that authenticity as self-realization and 
contribution as having a positive impact beyond oneself are two additional 
candidates for intrinsic value. In addition to showing how these two are 
separate from other intrinsic values, the article notes that meaningfulness 
and general worthiness of life are two separate issues, and the former is most 
closely associated with the intrinsic value of contribution. The fifth article 
(Four reasonable, self-justifying values) picks up from this spot, asking what 
criteria we could use to decide whether a certain candidate value truly is a 
self-standing and self-justifying value that is subjectively worth valuing. A 
separation is made between explicit and conscious values, on the one hand, 
and implicit deeply held preferences humans have been designed to have 
through evolution. I argue that such basic motivational dispositions to strive 
towards certain psychosocial experiences could offer a robust grounding for 
self-justifying values: if humans across cultures have a disposition to 
implicitly and intuitively seek certain experiences, then a corresponding 
explicit value would have a strong intuitive and widely shared appeal. The 
pursuit of the value would also be connected to psychological wellness and 
functioning through this close connection to a basic psychological 
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disposition. Thus, there would be both reflective and intuitive reasons to 
endorse such a value as part of one’s reflective value framework. Based on 
this mode of inquiry for identifying self-justifying values, in article 5, I 
review four potential self-justifying values, happiness, moral goodness, 
authenticity, and contribution, and I briefly look at whether there is 
psychological and evolutionary research to suggest that they could be backed 
up by the existence of a corresponding basic motivational disposition. 
Finally, article six (Is moral growth possible for managers?) argues that 
given that human moral outlook is largely inherited from one’s social 
surroundings and almost inescapably plagued by blind spots, biases, and 
general narrowness, a conscious commitment to aim to grow morally by 
expanding, developing, and challenging one’s current moral outlook becomes 
one of the key attitudes that a committed pragmatist ought to adopt if being 
morally good is part of what one wants to be in life.  
Having thus outlined the key arguments made in the current dissertation, 
I must acknowledge that I have deliberately aimed to present them in a 
nontechnical way in this introduction. I wanted to give the reader a general 
flavor of the arguments and points of views employed. This means that I had 
to omit many more difficult and more technical questions. For example, in 
previous paragraphs, I have used constructs such as ‘self’, ‘the world’ or 
‘value’ rather carelessly, without defining what they exactly mean and what 
philosophical baggage is already loaded into these concepts. In the rest of 
this introduction and in the articles themselves, I will elaborate on these 
issues, hopefully satisfactorily answering some more technical questions. 
The present project in its entirety is closely aligned with the pragmatist 
school of philosophy. More particularly, both the inquiry and many of its 
conclusions draw heavily from a Deweyan interpretation of pragmatism (e.g., 
Dewey, 1908, 1938). Throughout the arguments in this dissertation, I take 
inspiration from and find support in both Dewey’s own writings and in more 
contemporary authors who have followed in the footsteps of Dewey (e.g., 
Kitcher, 2011b; Pappas, 2008). However, this work is not a work of Dewey 
scholarship. My aim is not to build an accurate interpretation of Dewey, to 
stay completely loyal to him in my own arguments, or to otherwise engage in 
a historical analysis of Dewey’s thinking. Despite a significant intellectual 
indebtedness to Dewey, the claims of this dissertation should stand or fall 
independent of him. Except the first article, the articles take issue with some 
contemporarily discussed philosophical question and aim to bring a 
Deweyan perspective into it. Thus, I come to address audiences who might 
not be familiar with pragmatism or Dewey, but who are discussing a topic 
that in my view would benefit from pragmatist engagement. As we will see, 
the project is also relatively metaphilosophical, making arguments about how 
we should philosophize about certain topics in the first place. As a 
pragmatist, I find that the goals of certain types of philosophical inquiries are 
unattainable and actually prevent progress. Thus, to proceed in finding a 
satisfactory answer to a philosophical riddle, we might have to rethink what 
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kind of answer we are actually seeking. Instead of a quest for final truths, it 
might be wiser to search for practically working solutions and tools for 
thinking that enhance people’s capacity to live a life that is good and valuable 
for them.  
In this dissertation I will offer a few such intellectual tools and the most 
reliable conclusions I’ve been able to arrive at this point of my life and career 
as a thinker in the hope that they might illuminate something interesting and 
valuable for people reading these pages. Additionally, I offer these thoughts 
in the hope that sharing these conclusions stimulates critique and dialogue 
through which I and others could be able to further refine these conclusions 
in the future. The designing of one’s reflective way of approaching life is 
never finalized, and all the conclusions reached in this dissertation should be 
taken as preliminary, open to being refined – and even radically changed – in 
the future. With this in mind, I still hope that they offer some guidance in 
how one might reflectively approach life to enhance its value, 
meaningfulness, and worthiness. That is the ultimate goal of why I have 
devoted a nontrivial amount of time of my brief existence to writing these 
articles. 
LOCATING DEWEYAN PRAGMATISM IN THE HISTORY 
OF IDEAS  
“For fifty years he persistently worked to transform the 
scientific method of knowledge into an instrument of individual 
moral guidance and enlightened social planning.” (Rockefeller, 
1991, p. 3 on John Dewey) 
Pragmatism is a philosophical movement that saw its inception in the late 
19th century as the first truly American school of philosophy. Its roots can be 
traced back to ‘The Metaphysical Club’, a gathering of young scholars 
associated with Harvard that used to meet in Charles S. Peirce’s or William 
James’ study in Cambridge somewhere around 1871 to discuss deep 
philosophical questions (Peirce, 1905; but see also Wiener, 1946). A few 
years later, Peirce published two articles that are often seen as the first 
published presentations of pragmatism, even though they do not contain the 
term ‘pragmatism’ itself (Peirce, 1877, 1878). It took twenty more years 
before William James in 1898 coined the term ‘pragmatism’  in print – 
explicitly acknowledging his debt to Peirce (James, 1898). At the turn of the 
century, pragmatism was ready to conquer the United States, becoming the 
most influential philosophical movement for the coming decades. 
Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914), William James (1842-1910) and John 
Dewey (1859-1952) are often mentioned as the three founding fathers of 
pragmatism. Other notable pragmatists of this early period include Josiah 
Royce, George Herbert Mead, Jane Addams, C. I. Lewis, and F. C. S. Schiller, 
the last one operating in Europe instead of the US. The philosophical 
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traditions they drew most from were empiricism and Kantianism (Misak, 
2013), and in the case of early Dewey, Hegel. However, their thinking took 
them to a point where they, in a sense, transcended the dichotomies 
inherited from Europe between empiricism and idealism to arrive at a new 
way of understanding not only experience but also philosophy itself. What 
united them were certain attitudes (as I argue in article 1: Pragmatism as an 
attitude), which include especially “the denial of any foundation theory of 
knowledge”, “the thesis that human inquiry is continuous with, and develops 
out of, the biological and pre-cognitive interaction between organism and 
environment” (Margolis, 1977, p. 122) and that our epistemological 
commitments gain their value through their capacity to predict and help us 
navigate the experiential world. 
There are a few key dimensions that need to be mentioned about the 
intellectual setting where pragmatism was born. This setting was a time 
when the scientific worldview clashed with the Christian worldview in 
American universities and public spaces. How to reconcile God, faith and 
Christianity with science and evolution was one of the most heated questions 
of the time, and the early pragmatists eagerly offered their own intellectual 
solutions to these dilemmas. The early pragmatists were, according to Misak 
(2013, p. ix), “the first generation of philosophers to put some distance 
between philosophy and religion” in the US, where college philosophers had 
thus far also tended to be college ministers. Theirs was a philosophy that was 
naturalistic and faithful to empirical experience, and only then (in some 
cases) tried to reconcile religion with this naturalism. 
Furthermore, it is no coincidence that all three founding fathers – Peirce, 
James, and Dewey – were also working scientists who not only theorized 
about the scientific method but practiced it. Thus, the scientific way of 
thinking deeply influenced how pragmatists approached the world and 
philosophy. Peirce, for example, confesses that before starting to articulate 
any pragmatist theories, there was his “mind molded by his life in the 
laboratory” leading to the development of “the experimentalist’ mind”, which 
he then attempted to make into a theory (Peirce, 1905, p. 331). In addition to 
the scientific method itself, a key scientific development that had a powerful 
influence on how pragmatist thinking emerged was Darwinian evolutionary 
thinking. Rockefeller goes so far as to describe early pragmatists as “a new 
group of philosophers who turned to Darwinian biology rather than 
Newtonian mechanics as the key to an understanding of their world” 
(Rockefeller, 1991, p. 17). Darwinism led the pragmatists to realize that our 
intellectual faculties and capacity for thinking are not isolated from the world 
but developed by evolution for a purpose: to assist the organism. Dewey 
especially emphasized the fact that humans are first and foremost organic 
beings engaged with the world and only secondarily thinkers. 
Another key influence was a belief in a sense of progress. A young 
democracy that represented itself as the land of opportunities, the United 
States in the late 19th century experienced, after the bitter Civil War, rapid 
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economic growth accompanied by rapid industrialization, constant 
innovation, and the emergence of an expanding middle class. In such a 
historical setting, the static and tradition-oriented worldview had to yield for 
an enlightenment worldview that emphasized opportunities for growth and 
progress and future-orientedness more generally. Instead of a static world, 
where tradition could provide the necessary answers, people started to truly 
believe in progress and human capacity to transform the world through 
active striving towards better. Pragmatist philosophy with its emphasis on 
future-oriented practical consequences and meliorism was the philosophy 
that suited such historical setting especially well. 
Of the founding fathers of pragmatism, the present work draws most from 
John Dewey. While some versions of pragmatism come quite close to realism 
(see Pihlström, 1998; Rescher, 2003) and others, most notably Rorty (1982), 
are highly antirealist, leaning towards postmodernism, Dewey, in my 
opinion, provides a kind of middle ground with his experientialist version of 
pragmatism that is “more original and, indeed, more defensible” 
(Hildebrand, 2003, p. 5) than other versions of pragmatism. Thus, let’s 
examine him slightly more carefully. 
John Dewey was born in the town of Burlington, Vermont in 1859, the 
same year in which Darwin’s The Origin of Species was published. His father 
was a storekeeper, and the young John was raised under the strong influence 
of Vermont Congregationalism and evangelical pietism (Rockefeller, 1991, p. 
19). After graduating from the University of Vermont in 1879 and spending a 
few years as a high school and elementary school teacher, he decided to 
enroll as a graduate student to the department of philosophy at John 
Hopkins University. He received his Ph.D. in 1884 with a dissertation that 
concentrated on the psychology of Kant. Peirce was among the faculty in 
John Hopkins and Dewey took at least one of his classes, but George S. 
Morris, a neo-Hegelian idealist, had a much stronger influence on Dewey at 
this point. Dewey’s early philosophical career has been characterized as an 
attempt to put liberal Christianity on a neo-Hegelian foundation (Westbrook, 
2010). Another permanent influence was provided by his wife Alice Chipman 
Dewey, with whom he was wedded in 1886. She was a vigorous proponent of 
women’s equality and radical democracy and has been credited with turning 
Dewey’s focus from abstract philosophical problems to the problems of men, 
especially to pedagogy and democracy. Raised by free thinkers, she most 
likely also strongly influenced Dewey’s shift from a devoted Christian 
intellectual to a secular thinker (Westbrook, 2010, p. 23). During the latter 
part of the 1890s, while at the University of Chicago, Dewey moved steadily 
from neo-Hegelian idealism towards what would be called pragmatism. 
Often his philosophy is divided into two main periods, the early neo-
Hegelian period and the later pragmatist, humanistic, and naturalistic 
period, with his move to Chicago in 1894 taken as the dividing moment 
(Rockefeller, 1991, p. 19). In 1904, he moved from Chicago to the philosophy 
department at Columbia University where he stayed for the rest of his career. 
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Dewey remained productive even in his latter days. For example, one of his 
magnum opuses, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938) was published a year 
before his 80th birthday, and he published his last book in 1949 (together 
with Arthur Bentley) when he was about to turn ninety. He died in 1952 at 
his home in New York, at the age of ninety-two and was buried in Burlington.  
Dewey’s key philosophical ideas will be discussed in more detail in the 
rest of this introduction. However, while the present work touches upon 
many areas of inquiry where Dewey has trodden before, it must be 
acknowledged that certain key areas of Dewey’s philosophical corpus are left 
out. Most notably, Dewey’s pedagogical thinking and his views on democracy 
have been highly influential (e.g. Dewey, 1916a), but they are not covered at 
all by the present work. Also his ideas about art as experience are interesting 
(Dewey, 1934) but outside the scope of the present work. 
Along with Dewey’s purely philosophical contributions, his active role in 
public affairs must be acknowledged. He was an educational innovator who 
in Chicago founded a private elementary school as a laboratory for his 
pedagogical innovations and whose influence still looms large in modern 
pedagogical thinking. Among the myriad of leading positions within various 
organizations, one must mention that he served as president of both the 
American Psychological Association (1899) and the American Philosophical 
Association (1905). He was a Progressive Era reformer, an advocate of 
radical democracy, and a public intellectual who always had time to 
comment on various current domestic and international political affairs. 
Accordingly, many have seen him as the most important public intellectual 
the US had during the first decades of the 20th century. The New York Times 
once hailed Dewey as “America’s Philosopher” (Hickman & Alexander, 1998, 
p. ix) and an article in rhe New Yorker in 1926 described Dewey as the most 
influential American alive (Jackson, 2006, p. 54). 
By the 1950s when Dewey died, however, the influence of pragmatism had 
waned as logical positivism and analytic philosophy took the place as the 
philosophical tradition in the United States and the UK. In an era where 
young philosophers were animated by the possibility of nailing down final 
answers to philosophical questions by a promisingly exact philosophical 
method, pragmatism sounded too vague and imprecise. In the eyes of these 
philosophers, Dewey was regarded as “a nice old man who hadn’t the vaguest 
conception of real philosophical rigor or the nature of a real philosophical 
problem” (Gouinlock, 1972, p. xi; quoted in Westbrook, 2010, p. 16). 
In the 1980s and onwards, when it started to be increasingly clear even 
within the analytical philosophical community that it was impotent to deliver 
on its original promise, pragmatism started again to attract intellectual 
followers. Analytic philosophers such as W. V. Quine and Donald Davidson 
assumed theses and positions that pushed analytic philosophy closer to 
pragmatist conclusions. At the same time the anti-philosopher Richard Rorty 
became a name known even to the general public with his provocative and 
iconoclastic style (e.g., Rorty, 1982), but among philosophical circles the 
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names of Hilary Putnam and Richard Bernstein also stand tall. In particular, 
the quarrel between Rorty, the postmodern, and Putnam, the realist, about 
the legacy of pragmatists and Dewey awakened philosophers to the revival of 
pragmatism and how it could offer important insights to certain key debates 
within both analytic and continental philosophy (Margolis, 2006, p. 5). 
Additionally, Jamesian and Deweyan views of the mind have proven 
surprisingly relevant in modern cognitive science and neuroscience. For 
example, when professor Andy Clark (2016) integrated recent advances in 
the cognitive neurosciences to propose that the brain is essentially a 
prediction machine constantly engaged in simulation of the world in which 
top-down predictions attempt to accurately guess bottom-up sensory 
information in an iterative, hierarchical manner, he quotes Dewey 
approvingly, stating that “Dewey’s descriptions elegantly prefigure the 
complex interplay, highlighted by predictive processing” (p. 182). In recent 
decades, interest in pragmatism has increased in continental Europe, with 
the Nordic Pragmatist Network founded in 2006 and the European 
Pragmatist Association founded in 2012. In fact, the First Nordic 
Pragmatism Conference held in Helsinki in 2008 was where I was 
personally initiated into the world of pragmatism and realized how it could 
offer guidance for several philosophical questions where analytic and 
continental philosophy had been stuck. Given these developments, the future 
of pragmatism holds much promise! 
THE PRAGMATISM EMPLOYED IN THE PRESENT 
WORKS 
Having historically located pragmatism as a philosophical tradition, I’ll 
next briefly demonstrate how the type of Deweyan pragmatism employed in 
the present work approaches certain key philosophical topics. This serves the 
double purpose of giving an overall picture of the present intellectual outlook 
on life and introducing the articles of the present dissertation by showing 
how they fit into this wholeness. We will see how the same fallibilistic and 
forward-looking spirit of wanting to provide imperfect yet still somehow life-
enhancing tools of thinking to assist people to live better lives animates 
pragmatist thinking whether we apply it to metaphysics, ethics, science, or 
philosophy itself. 
STARTING POINT 
”We use our past experiences to construct new and better ones 
in the future. The very fact of experience thus includes the 
process by which it directs itself in its own betterment.” 
(Dewey, 1920, pp. 94–95)  
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What do we have at the beginning of a philosophical inquiry? What are 
the situational and intellectual prerequisites that need to be in place for a 
philosophical inquiry to initiate? Many philosophical inquiries are implicitly 
based on an idealized view of an asituational, pure rationalizing capacity 
pulling itself up on its own, which is rather similar to the infamous Baron 
Münchhausen, who saves himself from a swamp by pulling himself up from 
his own hair.  
Instead, I suggest that being capable of starting to philosophize is being 
already in possession of an “immense mass of cognition already formed” 
(Peirce, 1905, p. 336). The reflective inquiry of a human being takes place 
within a particular, historicized human life, it is conducted by a human being 
equipped with certain thinking habits and capabilities, and its outcomes 
ultimately feed back into this life (Dewey, 1938; Pappas, 2008). The 
reflective inquiries of singular human beings are conducted in close co-
involvement, coordination, and collaboration with other reflective inquirers 
(see article 2). Accordingly, the starting point for philosophical inquiry is not 
a neutral tabula rasa but an already relatively established point of view on 
life. Some parts of this starting point might be more explicit and articulated, 
and other parts function more as implicit, unrecognized background 
assumptions and attitudes that still significantly influence what paths of 
thinking or conclusions the person finds intuitively attractive and plausible. 
Indeed, this starting point influences even what kind of ideas we come to 
have in the first place and which paths of thought remain completely closed 
to us as we cannot even imagine their existence. 
In article 1 (Pragmatism as an attitude), my aim is to investigate what I 
call ‘the pragmatist attitude’, by which I mean the more or less explicit 
attitude of orientation that we find at the beginning of a pragmatist inquiry. 
The article argues that what unites classical pragmatist thinkers such as 
Peirce, James, Dewey, and Schiller is not certain explicit philosophical 
doctrines – among them, we find considerable disagreement – but rather a 
certain way of approaching the world and philosophical problems. Thus, 
William James argues that pragmatism is first and foremost a method, which 
means “no particular results” but “only an attitude of orientation” that lies 
“in the midst of our theories, like a corridor in a hotel”, through which all 
particular theorizing must pass (James 1907, 27). Similarly, Dewey takes 
“pragmatism as primarily a method”, agreeing with the Jamesian idea that 
this attitude or “temper of mind” is the most essential element of pragmatism 
(Dewey, 1908, pp. 86, 85). Even Peirce, who explicitly defines his 
pragmatism (and later pragmaticism) as a theory of the meaning of concepts 
(Peirce, 1905, p. 332), acknowledges that one cannot satisfactorily 
comprehend the theory of pragmatism without previous acceptance of 
certain attitudes that can be captured under the rather vague maxim “dismiss 
make-believes” (Peirce, 1905, p. 335). 
I trace this attitude underlying pragmatism to a certain scientific turn in 
thinking. Peirce notes that certain attitudes acquired through “his life in the 
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laboratory” form the backbone of his more explicit pragmatist theories 
(Peirce, 1905, p. 331). For James, the gist of the pragmatist attitude was an 
“attitude of looking away from first things, principles, ‘categories,’ supposed 
necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts” 
(James 1907, 27). He is strongly opposed to philosophy as a quest for final 
truths, seeing instead that all our theories should be treated as instruments 
used for certain purposes that are always open to be molded in the future 
(James, 1907, p. 26). Dewey agrees with both of these thinkers, emphasizing 
that all our conceptions and theories should be treated as working 
hypotheses and explicitly stating that “pragmatism as attitude represents 
what Mr. Peirce has happily termed the ‘laboratory habit of mind’ extended 
into every area where inquiry may fruitfully be carried on” (Dewey, 1908, p. 
86). 
Thus (as I argue in article 1), pragmatists seem to be united by a forward-
looking attitude that denounces any absolutes and final truths, instead 
treating all theories and conceptions as fallible and primarily as tools for 
guiding future action. They treat human inquiry – of which philosophical 
inquiry is one subtype – as a process that takes place within actual living and 
is thus constrained by the human condition and in the end feeds into it (see 
Bernstein, 2010, p. x). The first basic attitude of pragmatism is thus 
fallibilism, which means that “we cannot in any way reach perfect certitude 
nor exactitude. We never can be absolutely sure of anything” (Peirce, 1974, p. 
60). 
The second basic attitude is about the practice-oriented aim of inquiry. 
Dewey captures this idea well in noting how “ideas are essentially intentions 
(plans and methods), and [...] what they, as ideas, ultimately intend is 
prospective” (Dewey 1908, 86). As active organisms, the ultimate function of 
our cognitive capacities is not to observe the world but to assist us to navigate 
within it. Instead of seeing the world in neutral terms, we see it in value-
laden ways. As Dewey notes, “since we are creatures with lives to live, and 
find ourselves within an uncertain environment, we are constructed to note 
and judge in terms of bearing upon weal and woe – upon value” (Dewey, 
1925, p. 33). 
Finally in article 1, I argue that underlying these ideas of the nature of 
inquiry in pragmatism is a specific way of seeing the human condition. At the 
heart of this pragmatist worldview is taking seriously the fact that existence 
is primarily about experiencing; that a stream of experiencing already 
unfolding is the inescapable starting point of any form of inquiry. As Dewey 
notes, experience is not primarily “a knowledge-affair” but rather 
“experience is primarily a process of undergoing”, a temporal and ever-
evolving stream (Dewey, 1917, pp. 47, 49). This “stream of experience” or the 
“flux of our sensations” (James 1907, 66, 107) is the place within which our 
inquiry takes place and towards which it aims to contribute. I give more flesh 
to this notion of experiencing by noting that it seems to have three 
characteristics that I already mentioned in the beginning of this introduction: 
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First, our relation to this experiencing is active; we seem to play a role in how 
the experiencing unfolds. Experiencing is not a “one-way traffic” where the 
‘external world’ plays movies for a subject but is experienced as an 
interaction between an organism and its environment (Tiles, 2010, p. 102). 
This active role means that we are “obliged to struggle – that is to say, to 
employ the direct support given by the environment in order indirectly to 
effect changes that would not otherwise occur” (Dewey, 1917, p. 48). Second, 
we care about how this experiencing unfolds. Being active already presumes 
this kind of caring: “Action cannot exist without the immediate being of 
feeling on which to act” (Peirce, 1905, p. 345). Third, many parts of the 
experiencing seem to unfold without us being able to control it. As Peirce 
notes, “one cannot escape the fact that some things are forced upon his 
cognition. There is an element of brute force, existing whether you opine it 
exists or not” (Peirce, 1974, p. 73). Human experiencing thus seems to 
involve a sense of activity, purposefulness, and resistance. Taken together, as 
I conclude in article 1, “these three dimensions of our relation to experience 
amount to an understanding that the human condition means an active 
interest in developing the stream of experience in certain directions. Our 
primary interest as regards the world is about attempting to navigate our way 
within its constraints as best as we can.” 
This understanding of the human condition and the nature of inquiry is 
thus the starting point for a pragmatist inquiry, such as the present one. In 
calling this the starting point and emphasizing the attitudinal nature of these 
premises, I aim to draw attention to the fact that these amount to no proof of 
what the human condition is ‘truly about’. Instead, this understanding 
should be taken as the partly implicit attitudinal approach that guides how 
we start the philosophical inquiry. Instead of being the results of a rigorous 
philosophical inquiry, such attitudes are the backbones supporting such 
inquiry. They are, in James’ words, the “more or less dumb sense of what life 
honestly and deeply means” that we have acquired through living; they are 
our “individual way of just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of 
the cosmos” (James 1907, 5). They might be vague, but we just have to accept 
the fact that a more reflective inquiry has to start somewhere, and the only 
place it can start from is this more vague and attitudinal sense of how things 
seem to be that we have acquired through our experiential encounter called 
living. Through articulating and elaborating these ideas and attitudes, as I 
try to do in article 1, the aim is to become more conscious of them, and 
through that act of reflection, to start taking greater responsibility for them 
(see Dewey 1908, 97). 
METAPHYSICS 
“The chief characteristic trait of the pragmatic notion of reality 
is precisely that no theory of Reality in general, überhaupt, is 
possible or needed” (Dewey, 1917, p. 64). 
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Metaphysics, as classically conceived, is the study of the basic nature of 
the world. As a branch of philosophy, it aims to clarify what entities exist and 
how they are related to each other. As Dewey notes, “metaphysics is 
cognizance of the generic traits of existence” (Dewey, 1925, p. 50). One of the 
main questions of metaphysics concerns whether there is a reality ‘out there’, 
independent of our perceptions. Some pragmatists have aligned themselves 
with realism (e.g., Pihlström, 1998) even though such pragmatist versions of 
realism tend to involve a certain “subordination of realism [- -] to 
pragmatism” (Pihlström, 1998, p. xi). Other pragmatists, most notably 
Richard Rorty, take their version of pragmatism in quite antirealist and anti-
representationalist directions where references to ‘reality’ or calling a 
statement ‘true’ are “empty metaphysical compliments” within a 
conversation – mere harmless “rhetorical pats on the back” (Rorty, 1982, p. 
xvii). A third group of pragmatists try to steer clear of the question 
altogether, aiming to go “beyond realism and anti-realism” (Hildebrand, 
2003) as they see the whole distinction between realism and antirealism as 
based on a misunderstanding. Thus, we find Peirce remarking – in one of his 
more sardonic moments – that metaphysics “is a subject much more curious 
than useful, the knowledge of which, like that of a sunken reef, serves chiefly 
to enable us to keep clear of it" (Peirce, 1878, p. 301). 
The Deweyan stand on ontology and metaphysics adopted in the present 
work starts with acknowledging the primacy of experiencing and inquiring. 
As already outlined above, our engagement in an inquiry about the basic 
nature of the world already takes place within the stream of experiencing. 
For Dewey, inquiry as an activity is primary, and any ontological or 
epistemological commitments are entangled within and arise from this 
inquiry rather than stand outside of it as independent presuppositions. 
Engagement is primary and any dualism between, for example, ‘organism’ 
and ‘environment’ is something that can only be found through inquiry 
rather than something that predates it (Dewey, 1938, pp. 25, 33). 
Experiencing as such contains everything “in an unanalyzable totality” and 
any distinctions we come to make are “products discriminated by reflection 
out of primary experience” (Dewey, 1925, pp. 18–19). In a sense then, there is 
no ontology outside of epistemology, meaning that we cannot adopt any firm 
position on any ontological question without simultaneously acknowledging 
the process of inquiry, with its uncertainties, that lead to that conclusion. 
Sometimes, the Deweyan stand has been described as epistemontology 
(Barad, 1998, p. 109; quoted from Iedema, 2007), to emphasize this 
subordination of any ontological answers or principles to the fallible inquiry 
leading to them. 
On the other hand, in subordinating ontological answers to the fallible 
inquiry taking place within a stream of experiencing, one is already taking an 
ontological stand: one is acknowledging experiencing as something 
fundamental and ‘given’. Instead of starting with a distinction between the 
world ‘out there’ and perceptions ‘in me’, which inevitably leads to the 
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realism-antirealism-debate, Dewey thus starts from experiencing as a 
wholeness. As Brendan Hogan (2008, p. 136) notes, “’subject’ and ‘object’’, 
for instance, is a distinction instituted through inquiry and downstream from 
a primarily practical engagement with the world.” No distinctions, rules of 
inquiry or other fundamentals are accepted as a priori and given but should 
be understood as arising from and through inquiry into experiencing. 
“Experience yields method” in that we use it to find ways to make sense of it 
that aid us in improving it (Cochran, 2010, p. 5). Therefore, the value of any 
proposition about reality is “teleological, experiential, not fixedly ontological” 
(Dewey, 1906, p. 473). Given this strong emphasis on the primacy of 
experiencing, in article 2 (Fallible inquiry with ethical ends-in-view) I 
decided to call this Deweyan ontological position as ontological 
experientialism (see McGilvary, 1939). 
However, is there a self-contradicting circularity in here? On the one 
hand, Deweyan pragmatism is opposed to any ‘givens’ and emphasizes the 
fallible nature of all our ontological convictions. On the other hand, the 
position seems to emphasize experiencing as something given and 
fundamental to the point of using this emphasis on experiencing to justify its 
commitment to fallibilism. I see that a certain degree of circularity is 
inevitable because we cannot start an inquiry out of nowhere but must start it 
with the aid of whatever vague intellectual tools we have at our disposal. As 
Dewey states, “we cannot permanently divest ourselves of the intellectual 
habits we take on and wear when we assimilate the culture of our own time 
and place” (Dewey, 1925, p. 40). In other words, behind any cognitive inquiry 
are always some more or less unarticulated background principles that make 
the very inquiry possible. Thus, at the beginning of the inquiry, the emphasis 
on experiencing should not be taken as a fully formulated ontological 
position but rather a vague background attitude that leads us in certain 
directions in our inquiry. The thesis that inquiry should start from an 
experiencing already unfolding is thus not taken as something ‘objective’ that 
stands outside of inquiry. It is rather an attitude with which we start out – 
because we have to start out from somewhere – but which itself remains 
open to be modified if future inquiry so requires. Instead of a seeming 
neutrality hiding the background commitments taken as given, the present 
type of inquiry thus aims to be transparent about the vague attitudes from 
which it has started out. Through this inquiry, then, our understanding of its 
background assumptions also starts to become more clear, and thus 
experientialism slowly grows from a vague unarticulated background attitude 
into an explicit ontological position. Inquiry into ontology and metaphysics is 
thus partly a process where one aims to make one’s already existing ontology 
more explicit. As Blattner notes, “we have a pre-ontological understanding of 
being, and our job as philosophers is to make that pre-ontology explicit in an 
ontological theory” (Blattner, 2006, p. 20). This sentiment echoes Dewey: 
“We may begin with experience in gross, experience in its 
primary and crude forms, and by means of its distinguishing 
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features and its distinctive trends, note something of the world 
which generates and maintains it.” (Dewey, 1925, p. 366) 
EPISTEMOLOGY 
”Knowledge is to be defined in terms of inquiry, not vice-
versa.” (Dewey, 1938, p. 21) 
Epistemology as a branch of philosophy aims to specify what can we know 
and what knowledge is. For Dewey, the way to approach such a question was 
to “begin with successful cases of knowing and then analyze what goes on in 
them” (Gale, 2010, p. 68). Such success, however, is not found in ’finding the 
truth’ but rather in situations where inquiry successfully resolves some 
problem. There are, in essence, two key commitments in Deweyan 
epistemology: fallibilism and instrumentalism. Thus, in article 2, I come to 
call the Deweyan epistemological position as fallibilistic instrumentalism. 
Fallibilism, as already noted, is about acknowledging the fallible nature of 
all human knowledge. As mortal, situational beings, our ability to transcend 
our partial viewpoint is inescapably limited. In the constantly flowing stream 
of experiencing there simply are not any a priori given and infallible 
standpoints that we could take as totally certain. Dewey diagnoses the whole 
‘quest for certainty’ as a psychological malady to which philosophers through 
the ages have fallen prey (Dewey, 1929). Many weak souls have been unable 
to stare reality in the eyes. For such thinkers, “the feeling that the world of 
experience is so unstable, mistaken, and fragmentary” leads to the 
psychologically rather than rationally grounded conclusion “that it must have 
an absolutely permanent, true, and complete ground" (Dewey 1908, 87). In a 
constantly flowing world, we yearn for certainty and thus are willing to clutch 
at any straws that promise us such ‘objective’ comfort in an uncertain world. 
Pragmatism as an attitude means that one has to get a grip on oneself, give 
up the illusion of unyielding certainty, and accept one’s knowledge about the 
world as what it is: fallible. All theories and conceptions should be seen “as 
working hypotheses” (Dewey 1908, 86), no more, no less. We simply can 
never be absolutely sure of anything. That is the human condition. 
However, as elaborated in article 2, this situation does not mean that we 
should have no standards for evaluating the accuracy of our theories about 
the world. Notwithstanding the (mis)reading of pragmatism by some of its 
adversaries, accepting fallibilism does not have to lead to the conclusion that 
anything goes. Instead of a correspondence with an unreachable truth, the 
theories are evaluated based on their power to guide us in the stream of 
experiencing. Thus, the traditional spectator theory of knowledge “is 
replaced by a theory that regards the knower of the world as an agent in that 
world” (Putnam, 2010, p. 34). As agents in the world, we are not indifferent 
spectators but are active beings who are striving to live our lives as best as we 
can. The reason evolution crowned human beings with unprecedented 
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cognitive ability was not to make us more accurate spectators, but to improve 
our ability to act successfully in our environment. While knowledge as such 
might have value in the same sense as a piece of art has value, the 
fundamental way of evaluating knowledge that an active organism has 
acquired is about looking at its instrumental value. Some interpretations of 
reality seem to allow us to better succeed in our projects, while other 
interpretations lead to unexpected outcomes and failing to reach our desired 
destination. For example, there seems to be a strong practical necessity for 
accommodating our movements to robust physical aspects of the experiential 
world; running against a concrete wall will hurt and will not lead us to the 
place where we were headed (Määttänen, 2006, p. 13). Thus, a theory of 
reality that is able to distinguish concrete walls from doors and windows 
allows us to better navigate the built environment of modern cities. Through 
our constant daily interaction with experiential reality, we come to recognize 
patterns and ways of interpreting this reality that will typically lead to 
expected outcomes. An infant will learn that certain objects known to adults 
as door handles are useful when wanting to get to another room. When 
encountering a new closed door, the infant equipped with the door-handles-
open-doors theory can look for such a thing and thus get to a previously 
closed place. The theory thus proves its success in expanding the lebensraum 
of the infant. More generally, increased knowledge in pragmatism is not 
about getting the correct “representation of reality in cognition” but is an 
expression of an “increase of the power to act in relation to an environment” 
(Joas, 1993, p. 21). 
In this spirit, Dewey recommends replacing the words belief, truth and 
knowledge with the term warranted assertability to emphasize the ever-
evolving nature of human convictions (Dewey, 1938, p. 7). The word ‘truth’ 
carries so much objectivistic baggage that in his later writings he avoided 
using the word altogether. Warranted assertions are outcomes of inquiry that 
are so settled that we are ready to act upon them yet remain always open to 
be changed in the future. The assertions become settled and warranted by 
repeatedly proving their effectiveness in guiding us in desired directions in 
our inquiries and practical endeavors. The theories about reality thus face a 
type of natural selection where some prove successful while others fail, and 
thus we are constantly trimming the toolbox of beliefs that we use to 
encounter the world. As I argue in article 2, warranted assertions reached 
through inquiry are similar to maps of the experiential world, they give us 
tools to interpret it in ways that help us orient ourselves within it. Ultimately, 
we can only talk about these maps and how well they have guided our 
experiencing in the past. There is no need to talk about the ‘external world’ or 
the ’truth about the world’ beyond these maps, as there is nothing beyond the 
experiencing and our mapping of it we could ever be in touch with in any 
case. However, when the maps have “repeatedly proved effective”, they serve 
as stable conclusions on which future inquiry can build (Dewey, 1938, p. 
521). Some of the maps are so robust in predicting the future flows of 
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experiencing that they acquire, for all practical purposes, an apparent 
solidity. The theory that heavy-objects-fall-downwards has worked so well 
throughout our lives that we rely on it without blinking an eye in our 
encounters with the physical world. However, were we to suddenly wake up 
on the International Space Station, we would quickly have to abandon this 
belief and adjust our expectations about how objects move in this new reality.  
It needs to be acknowledged that ‘the pragmatist theory of truth’ has a 
relatively bad reputation within philosophical folklore. Sometimes it is 
represented as equating truth with utility, a claim that whatever is prudent 
for you to believe in any situation is true. At least since Russell (1910a, 
1910b), this interpretation is how the theory is sometimes represented and 
then dismissed as obviously implausible: “‘true’ does ‘not mean ‘furthering 
our purposes’” (Russell, 1910a, p. 110). While it must be admitted that the 
way William James (1907) sometimes talks about truth gives ample room for 
this kind of interpretation, Dewey was well aware of this criticism, and thus it 
is worth noting how he aimed to address it. First, as already noted, Dewey 
essentially gave up the whole notion of ‘truth’ as its objectivistic connotations 
did not fit into his inquiry-based epistemology. His epistemology did not 
require a notion of truth, and he preferred to talk about warranted assertions 
instead. Second, Dewey emphasized that instead of examining individual 
beliefs as isolated, we must understand and examine also the path that led to 
these beliefs (Dewey, 1908). Instead of the utility of singular beliefs in 
singular situations, what is relevant is the utility of our entire believing 
apparatus, including the methods of inquiry that we use to infer beliefs. 
Starting to believe in something without good reason just because it could 
have some utility is not only a matter of that belief itself. It is a matter of 
abandoning the whole process of inquiry that one has come to rely on in 
making warranted inferences. Thus, in a Deweyan inquiry-based account of 
warranted assertions, one cannot simply will something into a belief, as the 
warrantedness of any belief is dependent on the reliability of the path that 
led to that belief. 
All in all then, Deweyan fallibilistic instrumentalism means that we have 
no use for constructs such as ‘truth’ or ‘knowledge’ with their objectivistic 
undertones. The conclusions that humans can reach through inquiry are 
“always provisional, subject to modification as the result of subsequent 
inquiry” (Putnam, 2010, p. 37). The theories that we use to make sense of the 
experiential world are not ends in themselves but are rather instruments, 
“their value is determined by their efficacy as operative means” (Dewey, 
1938, p. 140). As fallible human beings we must settle with warranted 
assertions, some of which are more robust than others based on their 
instrumental value in guiding us in desired directions in past practical 
endeavors. The most robust of these assertions are such that they acquire a 
practical objectivity, which means that we unquestionably rely on them 
without any doubt in our practical endeavors, and the threshold for 
abandoning them even in the face of contradicting experiences is high. 
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However, even most robust of these assertions remain open to be changed if 
necessitated by future experiential realities where they no longer fit. Gravity 
could stop working; there is no objective guarantee that this could not 
happen even though from a practical perspective it probably makes no sense 
to prepare for this scenario. As fallible beings within unfolding lives, we must 
rely on the most robust and practically useful assertions we have acquired 
without reifying any of them into an objective ‘truth’. 
INQUIRY 
”Common experience is capable of developing from within itself 
methods which will secure direction for itself and will create 
inherent standards of judgment and value” (Dewey, 1925, p. 
41). 
Given the constitutive role of inquiry in both Deweyan metaphysics and 
epistemology, it becomes essential to examine more carefully what this 
inquiry itself is about. One could go so far as to suggest –as Ruth Putnam 
(2010, p. 39) does – thastyt for Dewey, his theory of inquiry includes his 
metaphysics, his theory of knowledge, and his philosophy of science. To 
understand how Dewey sees inquiry, we must start with acknowledging that 
the more reflective and deliberate forms of inquiry are outgrowths of a more 
basic type of proto-inquiry in which all organisms engage:  
“Upon the biological level, organisms have to respond to 
conditions about them in ways that modify those conditions 
and the relations of organisms to them so as to restore the 
reciprocal adaptation that is required for the maintenance of 
life-functions.” (Dewey, 1938, p. 60) 
In other words, all living organisms react to their experiential conditions 
by altering their behavior to bring forth desired experiences. For lower 
organisms, this reacting takes place on an instinctual level in a relatively 
behavioristic manner: A certain environmental trigger leads to a certain 
behavioral response, and this response has been evolutionarily selected for as 
it has tended to bring forth better outcomes in terms of the organism’s 
fitness. As I outline in article 2 (based mostly on Dewey, 1938), there are in 
essence three stages to this kind of proto-inquiry: (1) Indeterminate 
situation, which means that the organism encounters a disturbance or felt 
uncertainty in its experience. Some experiential encounter with the 
environment is what sets the inquiry into motion. (2) Behavioral response. 
To address the indeterminate situation, the organism makes some alterations 
to its behavior. To common stimuli, the reactions might be more or less 
predetermined, but if there is not a ready response for the encountered 
stimuli, the organism might just experiment with various random behaviors. 
(3) Desired experience or undesired experience. The alterations to behavior 
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lead – in the best-case scenario – to the settling of the indeterminate 
situation. The disturbance is solved or contained. This is the outcome that 
the inquiry aims to serve. However, sometimes the behavioral response does 
not lead to the desired outcomes, which triggers new behavioral responses 
aiming to bring the situation to closure.  
Organisms engage in this kind of inquiry continuously and human beings 
are not an exception. Many of human inquiries take place on this implicit, 
non-cognitive level without the need for any interference by the conscious 
mind. For example, to stand up without falling down, we need to constantly 
make slight adjustments to our posture to maintain balance. A slight 
imbalance (indeterminate situation) leads to slight postural adjustment 
(alter behavior), which leads to better balance (improved situation). This 
process typically takes place without any conscious awareness. As another 
example, we can borrow an illustration from article 2: “While walking on a 
road we suddenly note a car bearing down upon us in full speed 
(indeterminate situation). Before even realizing what is happening, we 
automatically jump to the side (alter behavior) and are able to avoid the fatal 
collision (improved situation).” No reflective or discursive thinking is needed 
for this process to happen. 
Human beings, however, are fortunate to have developed significant 
capacities for reflection and reasoning, which means that they can engage in 
more reflective and intellectual forms of inquiry (Dewey, 1925). Tiles 
formulates well the distinguishing quality of such inquiries: 
“Cognitive interactions are to be distinguished from 
unmediated response to stimuli, in that the subject can delay its 
response while experimenting (in thought or with physical 
actions) under the guidance of ‘ideas’ or ‘propositions’ – 
representations of possible responses and the outcomes that 
would follow those responses.” (Tiles, 2010, p. 106) 
In essence, this means that between the environmental trigger and the 
behavioral response, a human being can engage in mental activities where 
one simulates various possibilities to figure out what would be the best way 
to respond to the situation at hand. In other words, reflective inquiry makes 
it possible to “‘rehearse’ or try out activities before making a final 
irretrievable commitment to some overt action” (Hickman, 1998, p. 185). 
This rehearsing and simulation makes use of the mental maps of the reality, 
such as categorizations, concepts, and theories, we have developed through 
previous inquiries. Encountering a situation, we use our mental maps to 
make sense of it, to simulate possible actions within it, and finally to choose 
which of the possible actions we carry out. We also make use of various logics 
of inference. Certain paths of thinking are taken as legitimate while others 
are seen as leading to wrong conclusions. However, even the most basic of 
these logics of inference are, according to Dewey, not something a priori, but 
something that we have found out through inquiry to be useful to bringing 
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that inquiry into fruitful conclusions. In other words, “all logical forms (with 
their characteristic properties) arise within the operation of inquiry and are 
concerned with control of inquiry so that it may yield warranted assertions” 
(Dewey, 1938, pp. 3–4). In our inquiries, we not only shape our conclusions 
about the world but also constantly shape our ways of reaching these 
conclusions. In its wholeness, Dewey defines inquiry as follows: 
“Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an 
indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its 
constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the 
elements of the original situation into a unified whole” (Dewey, 
1938, pp. 104–105). 
The indeterminate situation thus initiates a process of reflective inquiry 
where we work with the indeterminate situation and our current warranted 
assertions, experiences, and ways of reasoning to produce some solution or 
harmonization for the situation. In the process of such iterative exploration 
of various possibilities, we might need to gather new information or engage 
in certain activities to explore their consequences, in order to validate some 
new hypotheses. 
However, our reliance on these mental maps to make sense of the 
experiential reality means that many times the indeterminate situations 
triggering inquiry are not practical in the sense of requiring immediate 
behavioral response, but rather intellectual: Something happens that does 
not fit into our mental maps and accordingly we feel that it does not make 
sense. For instance, a remark made by our friend sounds very 
uncharacteristic of him or her. A distant object in the air moves in ways that 
does not fit into any of the usual patterns of how birds, airplanes or 
butterflies move. This event triggers an inquiry through which we attempt to 
figure out what changes in our mental maps could make sense of the event. 
The goal of such inquiry might not be direct behavioral response but rather 
the harmonization of our mental maps of how the experiential reality should 
play out and how we feel it is playing out. 
Furthermore, given that these mental maps involve various concepts and 
theories, sometimes the inquiry might be triggered by one noticing that two 
separate theories one holds contradict each other. This discovery leads to a 
kind of intellectual inquiry that is already far removed from immediate 
experiencing and it might be hard to trace out any immediate practical 
consequences of this inquiry. Humans, especially philosophers, might thus 
be lost in their minds, spending hours upon hours in inquiries that are 
removed by several levels of abstraction from any immediate practical 
situation. Therefore, even though “there is no breach of continuity between 
operation of inquiry and biological operations and physical operations” and 
“rational operations grow out of organic activities” (Dewey, 1938, p. 19), the 
human reflective capacity makes possible second-order inquiries that take 
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place mentally, exploring the relations between various mental concepts 
without immediately leading to any behavioral responses. 
The outcome of such reflective inquiry is new or transformed warranted 
assertions through which we feel that we are better able to understand the 
unfoldings of the stream of experiencing. These new warranted assertions 
thus become the lenses through which we aim to predict and make sense of 
the stream of experiencing. They are in turn tested in future encounters with 
our lives and our future strivings within our lives. Therefore, even though 
human reflective capacity might lead us to inquiries that are very far 
removed from our everyday lives, ultimately all our inquiries are triggered by 
physical, emotional, or intellectual felt disturbances in experiencing and 
finally contribute to assertions about the experienced reality that make better 
sense of it and better guide our actions within it. As Hickman puts it:  
“There is thus first an ‘excursus’ from the existential situation 
into deliberation, and when deliberation has reached its end, 
its time for ‘recursus’ in which the results of abstract thinking 
are brought back to the existentially doubtful situation that 
triggered the inquiry in the first place” (Hickman, 1998, p. 
184). 
SCIENCE 
“Sciences themselves are outgrowths of some phase of social 
culture, from which they derive their instruments, physical and 
intellectual, and by which their problems and aims are set” 
(Dewey, 1928, p. 311) 
In the Deweyan view, science is a practice, a special type of inquiry 
humans have developed to produce assertions that are warranted by an 
especially rigorous procedure. Instead of a strict demarcation line, there is a 
continuity between inquiry in science and inquiry in everyday life (Putnam, 
2010, p. 39). Both “scientific subject-matter” and the procedures used in 
science have grown ”out of the direct problems and methods of common 
sense, of practical uses and enjoyments” (Dewey, 1938, p. 66). In the human 
quest for warranted assertions, certain practices for producing knowledge 
have proved themselves more reliable than others. The division of labor that 
is characteristic of modern societies has allowed us to have a profession 
where people specialize in a joint practice of aiming to produce especially 
warranted assertions about various aspects of nature, society, or other topics 
of human interest. Science does not produce objective ‘truths’ as it is subject 
to the same fallibilism from which all other forms of inquiry suffer. However, 
through a reflective and self-correcting process, science has aimed to 
overcome several biases and uncertainties that ordinary inquiries suffer 
from, and thus ideally produces assertions that are as warranted as is 
possible for the human species. ”To abandon foundationalism while holding 
 32 
on to science is to embrace some form of fallibilist self-correction”, as 
Margolis (1984, p. 76) aptly notes. 
There is thus no strict line separating scientific inquiry from other forms 
of inquiry. What makes certain conclusions scientific is that they have been 
produced through certain experimental procedures and/or subjected to 
certain institutionalized forms of scrutiny to guarantee that as assertions 
they meet certain standards of warranty. Science is essentially about “a 
system of checks and tests to be used before the conclusion of inference is 
categorically affirmed” (Dewey, 1916b, p. 271). The products of science are 
“instruments to be used to reduce, where possible, the indeterminateness in 
what would otherwise arise in the factual aspects of practical inquiries” 
(Tiles, 2010, p. 109). Science is thus a special form of practice, the aim of 
which is to provide well-warranted assertions on which the practices closer to 
actual living can then rely in aiming to solve the practical problems that they 
address. As I conclude in article 2: 
“What sets science apart from other forms of inquiry are its 
historically developed rigid standards, assessment procedures 
and institutionalized ways of involving others in the inquiry 
through which the scientific community aims to ensure the 
warrantedness of its assertions.” 
A key part of scientific practice is conducting experiments. To increase the 
warranties behind an assertion, it is often not enough to passively observe 
the world. Instead, one needs to actively engage with the world to test the 
theories. A theory is a hypothetical proposition about how the world works 
and is thus “open to verification or falsification by the occurrence or non-
occurrence of the consequences it predicts” (Putnam, 2010, p. 51). Therefore, 
between the formation of a hypothesis and the acceptance of it as a 
warranted assertion, there typically are experiments where one aims to 
manipulate the environment or at least the experimenter’s relation to it 
(Putnam, 2010, p. 47) to examine whether the reality behaves as predicted by 
the hypothesis. If the hypothesis can predict correctly (and/or better than 
competing hypotheses) how the world will unfold under certain conditions, it 
counts as evidence for the usefulness of the theory in future encounters with 
the world. There is, of course, no possibility for any ‘final verification’, after 
which the theory could be counted as true, but rather theories are evaluated 
as more or less reliable. The wider the spectrum of experiments and real-life 
situations is where the theory has given accurate predictions, the more 
reliable and applicable it can be taken to be. 
Another foundational element of science is that it is essentially a collective 
form of inquiry, as I argue in article 2. The aim is to transcend the 
limitations inherent in any individual standpoint; to be as detached from any 
particular personal standpoint as possible (Tiles, 2010, p. 109). Science is a 
profession where the community sets the standards that are used to evaluate 
the contributions of individual researchers. Before any individual 
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contributor’s conclusions are accepted, they are stated and evaluated by one’s 
colleagues, typically in a formal procedure known as the peer review system. 
After the actual experiments and one’s personal interpretation of their 
results, the crucial next step is about convincing one’s colleagues of the 
soundness and reliability of one’s conclusions, typically through written and 
transparent reporting of the whole story of the inquiry: one’s hypotheses, 
experimental procedures, results, and how one has aimed to address various 
potential shortcomings and competing explanations in one’s research. Given 
that no single experiment is typically able to address all points of criticism, 
science progresses slowly through several studies and preferably several 
researchers studying the same question separately using various types of 
data and experimental procedures. Through this collective process that 
involves actual experiments, interpretations of various data points, and 
theoretical discussions around them, the field progresses slowly towards ever 
more reliable warranted assertions (this progress is the hope at least) and an 
ever clearer picture of the contexts and situations where certain hypotheses 
are reliable and in what contexts another hypothesis is better able to guide 
one’s interpretation of future possibilities.  
Finally, it is worth noting that for Dewey, science is not only about certain 
collectively agreed procedures but also involves a specific individual attitude. 
He sees that scientific inquiry starts with adopting a particular scientific 
attitude towards the subject under investigation: 
“The scientific attitude may almost be defined as that which is 
capable of enjoying the doubtful; scientific method is, in one 
aspect, a technique for making productive use of doubt by 
converting it into operations of infinite inquiry” (Dewey, 1929, 
p. 228). 
Being skeptical about appearances and quick conclusions, consciously 
trying to produce counterexamples and alternative explanations, and 
entertaining various possibilities without the need to quickly adopt and 
defend only one of them are all parts of the attitude that a scientist 
approaching one’s subject should entertain. Thus, the scientific attitude is 
much about taking fallibilism seriously and accepting and becoming aware of 
the inherent biases and shortcomings of the ordinary human perspective and 
ordinary forms of human inquiry. Science “arises out of social praxis”, and it 
is “incurably ideological and contingent”, as Margolis (1984, p. 76) states. 
Acknowledging this starting point, the scientist aims to consciously identify 
and overcome, as much as possible, the biases and ideologies inherent in 
one’s own position. In all, science in pragmatism is about approaching 
various questions with a fallibilistic attitude making use of tested procedures 
to collectively ensure that the conclusions reached meet certain relatively 
strict standards of warranty. 
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PHILOSOPHIZING 
”The distinctive function of philosophy for Dewey, to the extent 
that it can be marked off for emphasis but not separation from 
other disciplines, is the normative consideration of human 
values – or, most simply put, the quest for a good life in a good 
society.” (Hook, 1925, p. ix emphasis in original) 
What role does philosophy have in this pragmatist Weltanschauung? The 
reader might already have identified a pattern in how the present type of 
pragmatism approaches various subjects. Thus, one could already guess that 
when pragmatism examines the question of what philosophy is about, again 
the emphasis is on the fallible nature of the conclusions reached and the 
ability of these conclusions to aid in human practices.  
First, then, we have to acknowledge that philosophy is not something that 
happens outside of life but rather within a life that is already happening. 
Philosophy is an activity, a practice in which a person can choose to engage. 
Thus, given that our existence appears to be limited by death and given that 
there are often more immediate matters that engage our mind – where to get 
food, how to ensure that others like me – philosophy as an activity requires 
some justification. Why would we allocate part of our limited time and effort 
to practicing philosophy instead of other possible pursuits? 
One option is to say that philosophy is its own justification in the same 
sense that playing chess is its own justification. As beings capable of 
reflective thinking, we humans simply enjoy various types of mind-games. 
Perhaps philosophy is one type of game that we can play. Similar to chess, 
being good at this game, being able to outmaneuver others, can win oneself 
social status and admiration from others. Perhaps if one can compete at the 
top level, one can make a living out of this mind-game. If one’s talents are in 
this area, it might be a nice way to get a salary and bring food to the table. 
Beats working in a fast-food joint for sure!  
However, I suspect that many of us would not be satisfied with this kind 
of mind-game analysis of why the practice of philosophy exists. Many of us 
would want to see some more substantial role for philosophy among human 
endeavors than a mere intriguing pastime. Pragmatists have been especially 
keen on criticizing the tendency of academic philosophy to become a series of 
technical internal debates that have little connection to any practical 
problems that people face in their actual lives (e.g., Kitcher, 2011a). As a 
technical self-serving and self-referential practice, philosophy will easily 
make itself into a discipline that it is all too easy to ignore. It becomes, as 
Dewey once put it, “sentimental indulgence for a few” or “mere arbitrary 
dogma” (Dewey, 1916a, p. 315). Just by reading the titles and abstracts of any 
prestigious philosophical journal one can easily conclude that for most of 
what is written, it would be very difficult to convince the general public that 
the questions actually have some relevance for how they should conduct their 
lives. There are happy exceptions, and at its best, philosophy has been able to 
35 
raise important questions to public awareness, but the risk runs deep of 
becoming entrapped in technical questions whose answers turning out this 
way or another have no relevance for almost any practical endeavor. 
As I argue in article 3 (Moral Philosophers as Ethical Engineers), 
pragmatism offers an analysis of why this entrapping in minuscule technical 
questions tends to happen. It is because even at our present age, many 
philosophers still dream of finding the final irrefutable solution to the 
questions they study. In this quest for absolute certainty (Dewey, 1929), any 
minor counterargument must be fully addressed and eliminated before one 
can proceed. Accordingly, a grand quest to say something relevant about a 
relevant question tends to get sidetracked into technical arguments and 
counterarguments related to tiny analytic details in the overall picture. In 
other words, the tendency to devote one’s brainpower to very technical 
analyses of practically irrelevant, small details is a symptom of a mismatch 
with hopes and reality. One desperately aims to reach absolute certainty 
through a human practice incapable of delivering such certainty. As Philip 
Kitcher paints the situation of modern analytic philosophy: 
“Any defense of the idea that philosophy, like particle physics 
and molecular biology, proceeds by the accumulation of 
reliable answers to technical questions would have to provide 
examples of consensus on which larger agreements are built. 
Yet, as philosophical questions diminish in size, disagreement 
and controversy persist, new distinctions are drawn, and yet 
tinier issues are generated. Decomposition continues 
downwards, until the interested community becomes too 
exhausted, too small, or too tired to play the game any further” 
(Kitcher, 2011a, p. 251) 
In place of the view of philosophy as a noble discipline delivering divine 
truths, pragmatism offers a more modest view of philosophy. As a human 
practice, philosophy is essentially fallible. It has no privileged access to any 
final or irrefutable truths. It is merely one form of inquiry that has adopted 
certain procedures and standards for evaluating and ensuring the 
warrantedness of the conclusions reached. While most scientific disciplines 
have specialized in developing rigorous procedures for engaging with the 
environment, philosophy, for the most part, takes place within the world of 
arguments. The various schools of philosophy have developed various, rather 
rigorous standards of what are acceptable arguments and forms of inferences 
that can be made to reflectively investigate the subject under study. What 
thus distinguishes philosophy from other forms of inquiry is the art of 
thinking clearly: It aims to be the most rigorous way of thinking about the 
most fundamental questions of human existence. 
At the same time, pragmatism is interested in knowing what we get out of 
this engagement in rigorous thinking. What more can time devoted to 
philosophizing offer than a mere status-building pastime? To offer an 
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answer, we need to acknowledge that the human way of approaching the 
world involves many types of warranted assertions, some of which are more 
fundamental than others. Our worldview is a conceptual scheme, by which I 
mean the “entire network of conceptual principles that we employ in 
interpreting experience.” (Järvilehto, 2011, p. 98; see also Quine, 1951). 
Based on C. I. Lewis (1929), Järvilehto argues that these conceptual schemes 
are hierarchical in the sense that some concepts are more fundamental than 
others. Upon seeing a black swan, we realize that our current beliefs cannot 
account for the existence of such a creature and we face a choice of what 
current believes to abandon. Abandoning the belief that all swans are white is 
the less radical alternative, as it leaves our other belief system relatively 
intact. Abandoning the belief that we can rely on our eyes to give accurate 
information about colors would be more disturbing, as it would cast doubt on 
many other beliefs we have. Abandoning the belief that there is an external 
world out there populated by other humans and animals would be even more 
radical, as we would need to abandon most of our other beliefs as well 
because they have been built on this assumption. Conceptual schemes – what 
I call here belief systems – are malleable and plastic, but some beliefs are 
easier to abandon, while giving up others is harder: “Changes in more 
fundamental conceptual principles reconfigure the entire conceptual scheme, 
whereas changes in more peripheral conceptual principles are less dramatic” 
(Järvilehto, 2011, p. 101). Therefore, the more fundamental role a certain 
belief has in our interdependent network of beliefs, “the more reluctant we 
are to disturb it” (Lewis, 1929, p. 306). 
Based on this spectrum of more or less fundamental beliefs in our belief 
system, we can now state that philosophy is an attempt to get in contact with 
the most fundamental and deeply held beliefs we have. While in typical 
inquiries the basic beliefs are taken as “operationally a priori with respect to 
further inquiry” (Dewey, 1938, p. 14), philosophy is an inquiry into these very 
beliefs. Blattner describes the philosophical task as follows:  
“We have a pre-ontological understanding of being, and our 
job as philosophers is to make that pre-ontology explicit in an 
ontological theory” (Blattner, 2006, p. 20). 
Many of the most fundamental parts of our conceptual schemes are so 
self-evident that we are not even consciously aware of how they are 
structuring our inquiries and ways of interpreting reality. What 
philosophizing aims to achieve is a more explicit and refined understanding 
of one’s basic beliefs that then allows one to make more reflective choices 
about what fundamental beliefs to commit to and what to abandon. Such 
inquiry into basic beliefs can be descriptive, aiming to “describe the actual 
structure of our thought about the world”, or it can be revisionary, aiming “to 
produce a better structure” (Strawson, 1964, p. 9; see also Haack, 1979). 
While our basic beliefs are often useful, sometimes they can hinder progress 
or be outright harmful to us and our communities. Philosophical inquiry, 
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through making explicit these beliefs, and by inventing new ideals and goals, 
can significantly assist human beings in building conceptual schemes that 
serve them better than previous ones. The old views are, of course, not 
inferior to the new ones in any absolute sense, but in the same sense that 
some new ways of farming or medicine are more successful than older ways 
(Dewey, 1938, p. 104). Equipped with the old views people were less 
“competent to reach the intended end of the inquiries in question” (Dewey, 
1938, p. 104). 
This task, then, is the task of philosophy in pragmatism. Not a quest for 
eternal truths, but rather a quest to build, through reflective inquiry, more 
beneficial basic convictions about the nature of this world, one’s place within 
this world, and what one should aim to do within this world.  
ETHICS 
“A moral principle, such as that of chastity, of justice, of the 
Golden Rule, gives the agent a basis for looking at and 
examining a particular question that comes up. It holds before 
him certain possible aspects of the act; it warns him against 
taking a short or partial view of the act. It economizes his 
thinking by supplying him with the main heads by reference to 
which to consider the bearings of his desires and purposes; it 
guides him in his thinking by suggesting to him the important 
considerations for which he should be on the outlook” (Dewey, 
1932, p. 309). 
Given the general task of philosophy as the reflective generation of 
warranted assertions that improve people’s ability to live a good life, ethics, 
as a branch of philosophy specialized in moral questions, should naturally be 
seen in a similar way. As I argue in article 3 (Moral philosophers as ethical 
engineers), moral philosophy should not be a quest to discover the objective 
moral truths. Instead, the task is to design the most functional ethical 
theories, concepts, and convictions. Morality serves specific functions in 
societies, roughly the function of making it possible for us to live together 
harmoniously. This means that morality should be seen as a “social 
technology” that “grows out of our needs and our social condition” and aims 
to address those needs and conditions as well as it can (Kitcher, 2011a, p. 
256). Moral principles, theories, distinctions, and values should thus be seen 
as tools that aim to help us to better address the various disagreements, 
conflicts, and other social dilemmas arising from the fact that several 
separate individuals aim to live together. When facing such dilemmas, we 
may possess better or worse tools to address them. Dewey is well aware of 
this issue: 
 “Like every analysis, it [the analysis of moral activity] 
requires that the one making it be in possession of certain 
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working tools. I cannot resolve this practical situation which 
faces me by merely looking at it. I must attack it with such 
instruments of analysis as I have at hand. What we call moral 
rules are precisely such tools of analysis” (Dewey, 1891, p. 194) 
As tools, moral principles and rules serve three functions as I outline in 
article 3. First, they serve as records “of past moral experimentation” 
(Fesmire, 2003, p. 59), allowing us to use the wisdom we have acquired from 
previous social encounters to address current social dilemmas. The moral 
principles that we have adopted have proved effective in the past and thus 
can significantly help us in future situations. We do not have to start our 
reasoning from scratch but can operate with the support of these existing 
moral tools. Second, moral rules can serve as tools of criticism (Pappas, 1997, 
p. 546) that help us see flaws in our current moral practices and theories. 
Given that our moral convictions operate to a significant degree on an 
emotional and implicit level, the articulation of these convictions helps in 
making them more transparent to us and others. This transparency then 
allows us to better examine, evaluate and criticize them. Third, designing 
new moral tools and ideals serves the function of moral imagination (see 
Fesmire, 2003): Through these new tools we can look past our current 
convictions and practices to find ways of living that we deem better but that 
we would not have even been able to envision without this imaginative 
experimentation. 
The moral philosopher should thus come down from the ivory tower and 
cease to imitate a priest who educates less enlightened minds about the 
truths of the matter – or who ignores the general public altogether to debate 
more noble matters with one’s more enlightened colleagues. Instead, moral 
philosophers should be public servants. Luckily many moral philosophers of 
both pragmatist and non-pragmatist bends already see themselves in this 
way and act accordingly. In this view, moral philosophers are ethical 
engineers whose task is to shape our current moral outlook by making it 
more transparent, by showing flaws in its design, and especially by designing 
new and better working moral tools. Just as engineers use their expertise in, 
say, bridge-making to design better bridges (see Dewey, 1939, p. 21), moral 
philosophers have acquired, through their education and engagement with 
the topic, significant expertise in moral matters. The task, then, is to use this 
expertise to design well-working moral tools that have the potential to 
improve people’s ability to live better together.  
VALUES 
“Before life began, nothing was valuable. But then life arose 
and began to value – not because it was recognizing anything, 
but because creatures who valued (certain things in particular) 
tended to survive.” (Street, 2006, pp. 155–156) 
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There is no room for any ‘objective’ or transcendent values in the kind of 
pragmatism propagated in the present work. A world devoid of humans (and 
other intellectual creatures) would be a world devoid of values. Values are 
one of the intellectual tools we humans have generated to better navigate our 
experiential world. All organisms, naturally, have some inbuilt motivational 
or proto-motivational dispositions that guide their behavior, making them 
seek certain experiences over others. A flower seeks sunlight, and a wolf 
hunts reindeers. As I argue in article 5 (Four reasonable, self-justifying 
values), also humans have many such innate motivational dispositions, or as 
Dewey (1939, p. 29) calls them, “native organic tendencies”. Thirst makes us 
seek water, hunger makes us seek food, and solitude makes us seek human 
company. As such, these tendencies are not values but rather implicitly held 
motivational preferences that guide our behavior (Haidt, 2001; Street, 
2006). A cow or a baby is almost exclusively guided in their behavior by such 
inherited or habitually learned motivational dispositions. As Welchman 
(2010, p. 169) notes, “we each begin life as bundles of organic impulses that 
prompt movement in and about our environments.”  
However, what makes us humans is our capacity for reflective thinking, 
which, in a way, is the capacity to step outside our current situation and the 
habitual responses offered by it to consciously choose how to behave. This is 
where the intellectual tools come in handy. Our concepts and theories are 
what make possible reflective inference; we reflect with these tools. In this 
scheme, values are one more intellectual tool we have. They are things we 
have consciously (and typically collectively) chosen to uphold and attempt to 
realize. Values are, in a sense, ”whatever is taken to have rightful authority in 
the direction of conduct” (Dewey, 1929, p. 256). Conscious awareness and 
firm conscious commitment makes something into a value. There is thus a 
key distinction to be made between “two radically different attitudes – that of 
direct, active, non-cognitive experience of goods and bads and that of 
valuation, the latter being simply a mode of judgment like any other form of 
judgment” (Dewey, 1916b, p. 226). In distinguishing between direct prizing 
and deliberate appraising, Dewey (1939, p. 5) thus made a distinction 
between implicitly held motivational preferences and consciously upheld 
values, a distinction that has in recent decades been confirmed by modern 
psychological research (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Haidt, 2001). Both prizing 
and appraising have motivational pull and guide our behavior but through 
different psychological mechanisms: one works more implicitly, the other 
through conscious choice.  
Values, which can be understood as reflectively chosen goals, are an 
essential element of any reflective inquiry. As noted, Dewey (1938, p. 499) 
sees that inquiry must “grow out of actual (or ‘practical’) social conditions”, 
and there should always be something that the inquiry aims to resolve or 
improve. Values, then, are the ends-in-view that can provide direction to the 
inquiry by providing an idea of what ‘improvement’ comprises. For Dewey 
(1930, p. 223), ends-in-view are the “foreseen consequences which influence 
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present deliberation” by providing it with direction and aim. This view means 
that inquiry is always value-laden: “The problematic situation has a deeply 
normative character” because it is primarily an action situation where 
“something must be done and there are better and worse things we can do” 
(Hogan, 2009, p. 286). To escape from a life that is “blindly impulsive or 
mechanically routine” (Dewey, 1939, p. 3), humans need valuations as 
something more solid and long-term that we can reflectively strive to realize. 
We need values both to guide our personal lives and to guide our collective 
endeavors. As stated by Dewey (1939, p. 2), “all planned human conduct, 
personal and collective, seems to be influenced, if not controlled, by 
estimates of value or worth of ends to be attained.” 
However, given the paramount importance of values in human conduct, 
how should we choose what values to uphold in our lives? The subjectivistic 
view of values that leaves no room for objectivity might make one worry. Is 
whatever a person chooses to value worth valuing? Given the lack of objective 
values that one can pick ready-made and mindlessly obey, the key question 
for a pragmatist is what values to consciously choose. 
The general answer is that the best values to uphold are a product of 
inquiry. Just as we constantly update our best theories about the nature of 
the experiential world, we also constantly update the values we see as most 
worthy of pursuit. We have our current, explicitly held values because past 
inquiries have led us to see them as somehow fitting who we are and what we 
want to advance during our brief lives. In this sense, we can have as values 
whatever we have come to uphold as a value through our conscious 
deliberation. 
However, despite this plurality, I argue (in article 5) that there are certain 
values that are more suitable for human beings given basic human nature 
and the typical life-challenges we face individually and collectively. In other 
words, a deeper understanding of our basic human nature could offer 
guidance in what values would be especially suitable to the kind of creatures 
we are. Given that as biological creatures we prefer certain experiences over 
others (pleasure over pain, satiation over hunger), and given that as social 
creatures certain societal arrangements tend to give more people room to live 
a preferable life, choices can be made between values that are more or less 
fitting for our life situations. In our quest for the best fitting values we are 
thus searching for some kind of reflective equilibrium between “all the 
evaluative judgments that selective pressures (along with all kinds of other 
causes) have imparted to us” (Street, 2006, p. 154). Some of the ‘fitting’ 
values might be fitting in certain socio-environmental conditions and for 
certain types of people, and others might be relatively broadly fitting for 
almost all socio-environmental conditions and for almost all people. The aim 
of inquiry into values is exactly about trying to identify those values that are 
as broadly applicable and as supportive of our various innate and learned 
preferences as well as our capacity to live together with other people. 
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Such inquiry can employ many methods. One classical method is analytic 
axiology, an attempt to reflectively identify, carefully define, and separate the 
key values humans might uphold. This conceptual work is often the 
necessary first step as it helps to clarify what we are even talking about and 
searching for in the more empirical part of the inquiry. This is the method 
employed in article 4 (Meaningfulness as contribution). The article engages 
with recent analytic scholarship into meaningfulness and intrinsic values 
(see Kauppinen, 2016; Metz, 2013), which have identified a few separate 
ways a life can be good. It argues, first, that we should see the 
meaningfulness and worthiness of a life as two separate questions. 
Worthiness is the broadest evaluative question we can ask about a life. It 
means that one is evaluating a life taking all possible things into account that 
could influence such a judgment. Worthy life is thus what Haybron (2008, p. 
36) calls a good life: “a life that is desirable and choiceworthy on the whole: 
not just morally good, or good for the individual leading it, but good, all 
things considered – good, period.” 
Self-justifying values, in turn, are values that need no further justification, 
that are considered valuable of their own accord. Self-justifying values are 
thus what make life good and worthy. They are the separate dimensions we 
use when evaluating a life and its value and worth. Most widely accepted self-
justifying value is typically happiness, which is a broad notion covering both 
short-term and long-term positive affective experiences humans might have. 
It seems to be built into our basic nature that we prefer pleasure over pain. 
This preference does not have to be justified with something else, but 
pleasure seems to be intrinsically preferable. However, happiness is not the 
only thing in which we are interested when examining the goodness of life. 
Moral goodness is typically taken to be another intrinsically valuable 
dimension of a good life (Haybron, 2008; Wolf, 2010), and it is often argued 
that the meaningfulness of a life is a third independent way in which a life 
can be good (Wolf, 2016). In article 4, I build on this framework to argue that 
our intuitions about meaningfulness and its intrinsic value actually seem to 
hide two separate self-justifying values: authenticity and contribution. 
Authenticity, as I argue in article 4, is roughly about ”being true to oneself, 
living authentically, being able to make autonomous choices and being able 
to express who one really is in one’s words and actions.” Following thinkers 
such as Kierkegaard (1992) and Sartre (2007), I argue that there seems to be 
something intrinsically valuable about this sense of authenticity. It has a 
dignity that is not reducible to mere pleasurable experiences that might be 
derived from it. There are situations where we are willing to sacrifice our 
personal happiness to be able to live more authentically and to remain true to 
ourselves.  
Contribution, in turn, is about the positive impact beyond itself that a 
particular life is able to make. It is about a life mattering, having somehow 
contributed beyond the subject in question. I argue that contribution seems 
to be separate from the other identified self-justifying values and still 
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something that we value as such. We might find a life that only contributes to 
its own well-being and authenticity as shallow because we yearn to make a 
difference in the world. This issue is also a separate yearning from mere 
moral goodness as I illustrate in article 5. For example, Nelson Mandela, 
when released from prison, could have chosen either to dedicate his time to 
his family and children or to the nation. From a moral point of view, both 
choices would have been justified, but from a contribution point of view, 
choosing the former ensured that his life had a much broader impact beyond 
itself. Thus, I argue in article 5 that when a pragmatist starts to make choices 
about what self-justifying values to uphold, there are certain key candidates 
that one should at least consider, chiefly among them happiness, moral 
goodness, authenticity and contribution.  
This analytic separation and definition of a few potential self-justifying 
values is essential groundwork as only after we have identified a candidate 
can we start to examine its qualities in more detail. However, what is the 
pragmatist way of evaluating these candidate self-justifying values? Given the 
essentially subjective stance of the present type of pragmatism on values, can 
we not adopt whatever we want as a self-justifying value? In principle, it is 
true that there are no objective or absolute limits to what could be taken as a 
self-justifying value. However, in practice, our human nature makes certain 
types of values easy and natural to uphold, and some other types of values 
very difficult to truly endorse. More particularly, in article 5 (Four 
reasonable, self-justifying values), I argue that human motivational 
psychology is not only about consciously upheld values and goals, but much 
about implicitly held preferences or ‘proto’ values (Haidt, 2001; Street, 
2006). Furthermore, while many of our implicit preferences are the result of 
our idiosyncratic life experiences, there are also a limited number of basic 
preferences that evolution has shaped us to have. In particular, in addition to 
basic physical needs, humans also have certain basic motivational 
dispositions to seek certain psychosocial experiences that recent 
psychological research has examined (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Deci & 
Ryan, 2000; Sheldon, 2011). A few examples of these needs are the human 
need to belong in the sense of having close and caring relationships in one’s 
life and the human need to contribute in the sense of feeling that one’s 
impact on the wider world is positive (e.g., Martela & Ryan, 2016). Now, 
while explicitly held and consciously chosen values are relatively easy to 
change through reflection, these implicit motivational dispositions sit so 
deeply within our basic human nature that they guide our affective and 
behavioral responses regardless of whether we consciously endorse them. 
This implicitness means that while these basic motivational dispositions are 
subjective in the sense of not being mind independent, they are still more or 
less conscious-mind independent.  
Given that such basic motivational dispositions exist independent of our 
conscious mind, choosing self-justifying values that are in alignment with 
these dispositions makes much sense. Self-justifying values should be values 
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that need no further justification; they provide their own justification. If a 
candidate self-justifying value is closely connected with a corresponding 
basic motivational disposition, then it would have strong motivational appeal 
and feel as something that needs no further justification. Furthermore, given 
that humans share the same basic motivational dispositions, the self-
justifying value would also have wide appeal across cultural boundaries. 
Thus, arguably, such self-justifying values provide the most widely appealing 
value system that would be in alignment with what humans already seek as 
part of their basic nature. Accordingly, in article 5, I suggest that in 
evaluating various potential self-justifying values, we should especially 
examine how well they align with our human nature and the basic 
motivational dispositions humans have. 
Now, a reader familiar with Dewey’s aversion to intrinsic values (see, e.g., 
Dewey, 1939, pp. 24–25) might ask whether this search for the most natural 
self-justifying values is somehow contradictory to Dewey’s aims. 
Commentators such as Welchman (2010, p. 172) have emphasized that 
Dewey denied that any distinction between intrinsic/inherent or 
extrinsic/instrumental values reflect a real difference in the things to which 
they are attributed: “There is nothing in the nature of prizing or desiring to 
prevent their being directed to things which are means” (Dewey, 1939, p. 27). 
Dewey’s point seems to be that in practical affairs there are no such things as 
‘pure ends’ completely “independent of the appraisal of things as means” 
(Dewey, 1939, p. 25). Instead, every end is just one chain in an unfolding 
stream of intertwined means and ends. When considering a particular end, I 
am also considering the means needed to reach that end and the further 
consequences to other areas of my life and to my other ends that reaching for 
that end would likely cause. All these factors have a role when I evaluate how 
much I actually desire that end. For these reasons, it is a fallacy to interpret 
“what is designated by these terms as out of relation to anything else and 
hence as absolute” (Dewey, 1939, p. 26). 
Here, I agree with Dewey. The self-justifying values I propose should 
indeed not be seen as absolute but rather as empirical generalizations about 
the kinds of values that would most likely be a natural fit for humans. Dewey 
emphasized the importance of “an empirical analysis of concrete desires and 
interests as they actually exist” (Dewey, 1939, p. 29), and the self-justifying 
values proposed here aim to take seriously the results of such empirical 
analyses that have proliferated in recent decades. Instead of something 
absolute and objective, I see ‘self-justifying values’ as a tool, a category of 
values that can be highly helpful for an individual aiming to build one’s own 
value system, for societies aiming to build their value systems, and for 
various occasions where people from different societies and groups aim to 
build common ground. The science of self-justifying values is an attempt to 
identify those values that are most in alignment with basic human nature, 
where what is ‘human nature’ is an empirical and probabilistic question. A 
list of self-justifying values should be one tool in the toolbox of moral 
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principles, the whole content of which should be considered as “tentative 
outcomes of ongoing, collective human inquiry into the means and methods 
available for ameliorating serious obstacles to the satisfactory conduct of 
personal and social life” (Welchman, 2010, p. 181). 
Thus there is no ‘true’ and ‘final’ list of basic motivational dispositions, 
but rather there are a handful of candidates with weaker or stronger 
empirical evidence behind them. But as Welchman (2010, p. 182) notes, 
building on our empirical knowledge about human physiology and 
psychology, “we can generate a ‘thin’, cross-cultural account of certain 
necessary constituents of welfare that may be used to evaluate practical 
deliberations both individual and collective.” As science around human 
nature progresses, the philosophical conclusions about the most suitable self-
justifying values should also progress to stay aligned with this development. 
Accordingly, I argue that in looking for the most robust ends-in-views 
possible in this fallible world of experiencing, we should take a serious look 
at the research on basic motivational dispositions and use this knowledge to 
construct, in an engineering sense of the word,  value systems that are most 
prone to leading to good living at individual, societal, and cross-societal 
levels. 
GROWTH 
“We may say that the good person is precisely the one who is 
most conscious of the alternative, and is the most concerned to 
find openings for the newly forming or growing self.” (Dewey, 
1998, p. 353)(Dewey 1998, p. 353)  
When no final and absolute standards exist for morality, but one still 
needs to make choices in one’s life, how to ensure that these choices are 
moral? Pragmatism does not offer a ready-made moral framework with pre-
existing standards against which one can evaluate one’s behavior. Typically, 
pragmatists do not offer very explicit normative theories. Welchman (2010, 
p. 182), for example, states that Dewey “did not engage in normative debates 
nor attempt to develop his own normative theory.” Yet, in being against a 
commitment to firm and final moral standards, pragmatism comes to be for 
one particular ethical commitment: moral growth. 
Moral growth means a commitment to improve one’s moral standards 
and conduct, as I argue in article 6 (Is moral growth possible for 
managers?). Fallibilism leads to a worldview where one can never rest on 
one’s oars, convinced that one’s current moral principles and other moral 
tools are already perfect and final. When instead of final answers one 
acknowledges that all one’s answers are temporary and more or less well-
grounded, it quite naturally follows that one wants to seek those answers that 
are better grounded, which is a lifelong quest. 
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Each person in a particular situation brings into the situation one’s moral 
past and the moral tools that one has acquired through one’s biological 
dispositions, one’s upbringing, and one’s idiosyncratic life experiences. 
Growing up in a certain culture leads one to value certain things and shun 
other things. “The presuppositions, prejudices, and confusions of one’s 
cultural inheritance set the inescapable context for value inquiries”, as 
Fesmire (2003, p. 12) notes. We did not have a say regarding into what 
family and what culture we were born. Thus, Hugh LaFollette, who grew up 
in Nashville, Tennessee in the 1950s, acquired the racist attitudes that were 
all around him: “I grew up a bigot, living in a land of bigots” (LaFollette, 
2001, p. 409). However, listening to the courageous speeches of the civil 
rights movement activists, he was forced to rethink his attitudes. This 
thinking led him to evolve morally and to acquire new beliefs and attitudes, 
where the equality of people became a grounding moral principle. 
The commitment to moral growth, then, is a conscious effort to transcend 
the necessarily narrow and unreflective moral framework with which one has 
grown up. Given that there are no external evaluative standards, one 
becomes personally responsible for cultivating one’s moral outlook to escape 
the blind spots, biases, and narrowness that almost inevitably plague 
uncultivated morality. Dewey saw that when evaluating a person’s morality, 
we should not concentrate much on a static evaluation of a person’s current 
moral beliefs, but rather on a dynamic evaluation of the person’s willingness 
to evolve morally. For him, the difference between high and low selves was 
“that between the attained static, and the moving, dynamic self” (Dewey, 
1998, p. 353). Thus, we should not condemn Hugh LaFollette for growing up 
in a culture of bigots. We should praise or condemn him based on whether he 
accepted this moral framework as such or whether he took efforts to 
transcend it when confronting experiences that did not fit into it. More 
broadly, moral growth means striving to use one’s experiences and available 
lessons to actively develop one’s moral toolbox towards a system that is more 
internally consistent, based on more defensible premises about human 
nature and the world, and offers better ways to confront the various 
situations one faces in one’s life. Growth thus does not take place against 
some objective standards, but rather is about a situation where from the 
point of view of one’s new moral system, it feels like an improvement 
compared to the old system. 
In article 6, I list a few key attitudes or habits that a person committed to 
moral growth should adopt to best ensure such growth. First, one should 
admit the incompleteness of one’s current moral outlook and thus not 
become defensive when something in one’s experiential world might 
challenge it. Second, one should not only develop one’s moral system when 
passively confronting something that challenges it, but one should actively 
seek opportunities to expand one’s moral horizon. One should actively seek 
voices that disagree with oneself and can provide new viewpoints and ways of 
seeing things. Third, one should give others’ opinions and viewpoints a 
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charitable interpretation. When facing a new argument one should try to 
interpret it in as good a light as possible instead of the all too common habit 
of deliberately misinterpreting it to more easily dismiss it. Fourth, one 
should try to keep one’s values and beliefs up-to-date as the world changes. 
Beliefs and attitudes that were taken as completely normal when one was 
twenty can become widely reprehended when one has reached the age of 
sixty. Finally, one should engage in moral imagination where one 
momentarily abandon’s one’s current attitudes and imagines how one would 
react, act, and think if one approached the world utilizing somewhat different 
attitudes and believes. This process can help both to better understand one’s 
current moral worldview and to find alternatives that could actually be better 
in some sense. 
This commitment to growth takes pragmatist ethics to the everyday. 
Every choice a person makes is an opportunity to either grow or decline 
morally, as I argue in article 6. Dewey notes how every choice sustains a 
double relation to the self. It both “reveals the existing self”, making visible 
the path that you’ve taken to get here, and “forms the future self” (Dewey, 
1998, p. 342). Through our choices, we choose what kind of person we want 
to be in the future. Instead of passively accepting one’s current moral outlook 
as good and final, a pragmatist of the present type should thus make a 
conscious attempt to update and grow one’s moral beliefs and one’s key 
moral commitments. Through such moral cultivation, one aims to have a 
moral outlook that is more capable of looking at the same situation from a 
wider set of viewpoints, ensuring a more reflectively chosen and more widely 
defensible course of action. 
CONCLUSION 
How to live? For organisms capable of reflection thrown into a world in 
which they need to act, this question is the broadest practical question about 
life. We are already living, our lives are constantly unfolding, and we are 
blessed and cursed with the ability to reflect on how to act. The potential to 
choose differently and to act in a novel way is present in every moment. 
Some potential paths constantly present themselves to the agent; other 
potential paths are concealed by the narrowness of our current habits of 
thinking. Yet we must navigate through this experiencing by making the 
choices we see as best in some sense of the word. Some choices lead to 
outcomes more attractive to us, and in the best case, to a life that we will see 
as good and worth living. To get the most out of this potential given to us, we 
would benefit from having some guidelines on how to think about the world 
and what to strive for within it. This is where philosophy steps in. 
Browning (1999; quoted in Pappas, 2008, p. 11) notes how ”the starting 
point … of all our attempts to enhance the meaning of our lives” is located in 
the “everyday experience.” Everyday experience is also where philosophizing 
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starts. The human condition is that of active experiencing, which means that 
“we make use of experience, noting its functional constancies and acting 
upon those constancies to refine the ways in which we draw from experience, 
thereby improving upon it” (Cochran, 2010, p. 5). Through such an iterative 
process of language-assisted reflection, we can step outside of the urgencies 
of the mundane and towards levels of abstraction that are unfathomable to 
our closest primate relatives. We can make generalizations, coin new 
concepts to highlight certain aspects of experiencing, and use the empirical 
scientific methods to examine the world and to generate highly warranted 
assertions about its basic nature.  
Everyday experience is, however, also where philosophizing should end. 
The ability to transcend the mundane and enter the world of abstractions is 
important, but the ability to travel back is equally important. This process is 
about harvesting the lessons learned on the abstract and conceptual level to 
apply them to actual living. A philosophical inquiry – as any other inquiry – 
ultimately serves people’s capacity to live good, meaningful, and valuable 
lives. The conceptual tools we philosophers build – distinctions, 
clarifications, theories, novel constructs – should not only serve the petty 
intellectual games of the ivory tower. Their value is ultimately connected to 
their ability to enhance, enrich, and enable people to navigate their lives in 
directions seen as good. An important part of this philosophical inquiry is 
also to assist people in making more reflective and informed choices as 
regards what values are worth striving for and what standards to use to 
evaluate a life as good. 
Accordingly, the greatest service that philosophy can provide to humanity 
is to offer people intellectual tools that enhance their ability to live 
meaningful, valuable, and good lives. This is a grand task. Thus, any 
individual studies can only shine light on some small aspects of this broad 
project. The present introduction and the articles that follow are my attempt 
to say something valuable that could in the best case advance this project. 
They represent my current best conclusions about how to approach this task 
of enhancing people’s capability to live a good life. Remembering fallibilism 
we should naturally approach these conclusions with a certain degree of 
skepticism. First, the Gibbardian caveat should be applied to them: “If the 
psychological facts are roughly as I speculate, here is what might be said 
philosophically” (Gibbard, 2002, p. 30). Twenty years from now, some of the 
psychological conclusions that the present work builds upon will have surely 
been transformed in some way or another. Some crucial flaws or blind spots 
in the philosophical arguments of the present work have surely surfaced. 
However, in an imperfect world where one only has a limited lifetime during 
which to reflect, write, and publish, this is the best that one can do. Waiting 
until one’s arguments are perfect inevitably leads to dying with a closet full of 
manuscripts from which no one benefited. Life is happening now. People 
need better tools for thinking already today. In choosing when to publish 
one’s conclusions, one must balance the constantly present and practical 
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need for such conclusions with the need to ensure that such conclusions are 
sufficiently warranted. This balance means that one must be able to tolerate 
certain degrees of imperfection. Ultimately, one must give to the world one’s 
imperfect conclusions in the hope that they could still do more good than 
harm in influencing people’s thinking and acting. There is a real possibility 
that one fails, yet one must try. One must try because in this imperfect world, 
there is no alternative to using such inevitably fallible tools of thinking. Some 
of these tools turn out to be better than others in the sense of leading to more 
accurate predictions about how things unfold and to better behavioral 
responses to the various challenges that life presents to the person. 
Philosophy is the craft of using one’s reflective capabilities in interaction with 
others to design the best possible tools of thinking one can make. This work 
is a sample of my current toolbox. While some of the tools might already 
prove useful, there is also the hope that the interaction that their publication 
makes possible helps me and others to design even better tools in the future.  
In brief:  
Life is short. Reflection is inescapably narrow and imperfect. Yet one 
must live. In living, one makes use of those tools of thinking one has 
available. Philosophy has the capacity to design novel and improved tools for 
such thinking. Indeed, it is the duty of philosophers to design such tools. 
Therefore, herein are a few such tools. My hope is that they have the ability to 
transform some lives for the better; that these tools can assist someone to 
live a better life than what they would have been capable of living without 
these tools. Living to fulfill this hope is what makes a philosopher – including 
yours truly – a pragmatist. 
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